Orientador : Flavio Rocha Gorini

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Matematica, Estatistica e Ciencia da Computação

Resumo: Nesta tese lidamos com o seguinte jogo de Blotto: Dois políticos devem alocar, secretamente, seus recursos igualmente entre um número de eleitores. Cada eleitor vota no político que lhe der mais recursos. Nós apresentaremos soluções assintoticamente ótimas para esse jogo

Abstract: In this thesis we deal with the following Blotto Games: Two politicians must allocate secutly, their resources equally among a number of voters. Each voter votes for the politician that gives him more resources. The politician that receives more votes win the game. We give asymptotically...

Abstract: In this thesis we deal with the following Blotto Games: Two politicians must allocate secutly, their resources equally among a number of voters. Each voter votes for the politician that gives him more resources. The politician that receives more votes win the game. We give asymptotically optimal soluctions for this game