Agradecimentos: Thanks to Barrio’s careful analysis of BLE and LETJ, we have been able to clarify the conceptual framework that motivates the intended interpretation of LETs. Thanks to Lo Guercio’s and Szmuc’s criticisms, we have improved the characterizationof evidencein order to make clear that availability of evidence for a propositiondoes not imply the rational acceptance of that proposition, and that the epistemic aspect of our approach to paraconsistency does not lie in anydoxastic attitude of an agent toward a proposition, but rather in the concept of a justification that may be partial or wrong. We would like to thank Henrique Antunes, Jonas Arenhart, Eduardo Barrio, Ederson Safra, and three anonymous referees for some valuable comments on aprevious version of this text Ver menos

Abstract: The aim of this text is to reply to criticisms of the logics of evidence and truth and the epistemic approach to paraconsistency advanced by Barrio [2018], and Lo Guercio and Szmuc [2018]. We also clarify the notion of evidence that underlies the intended interpretation of these logics and is a central point of Barrio’s and Lo Guercio & Szmuc’s criticisms Ver menos