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|Title:||From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism|
|Abstract:||Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism - van Inwagen's "First Formal Argument" - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilism is a modal fallacy. Here, I refute both claims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen's "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield's charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren't able to do otherwise from what we actually do)|
|Appears in Collections:||CLE - Artigos e Outros Documentos|
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