Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/340690
Type: Artigo
Title: From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism
Author: Merlussi, Pedro
Abstract: Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism - van Inwagen's "First Formal Argument" - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilism is a modal fallacy. Here, I refute both claims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen's "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield's charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren't able to do otherwise from what we actually do)
Subject: Falácias (Lógica)
Country: Brasil
Editor: UNICAMP/CLE
Rights: Aberto
Identifier DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2019.V42N3.PM
Address: https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452019000300086
Date Issue: 2019
Appears in Collections:CLE - Artigos e Outros Documentos

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