Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/336957
Type: Artigo
Title: Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument
Author: Thorpe, Joshua Rowan
Abstract: Putnam's vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken
Subject: Epistemologia
Filosofia da mente
Ceticismo
Country: Países Baixos
Editor: Springer
Rights: Fechado
Identifier DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1126-3
Address: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-018-1126-3
Date Issue: 2019
Appears in Collections:CLE - Artigos e Outros Documentos

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